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The consequences upon patient care of moving Brits 
Hospital: A case study
C A Pfaff, I D Couper
In 1994, with the advent of democratic rule, South Africa 
embarked on a review of the national public health care 
system, including services created under apartheid rule that 
often did not reflect the service needs of the populations. The 
review also included a hospital revitalisation programme to 
upgrade the poor quality of certain health care infrastructure.1 
As part of this process, North West Province undertook 
in 2001 a strategic review of district health services. Brits 
Hospital is situated in a rural farming and mining community 
60 km north-west of Pretoria. It is the only hospital serving 
the Madibeng municipality, which has a population of about 
338 262.2 At the time of the review, Bojanala district (in which 
Brits Hospital is situated) had 1 280 available beds, often with 
low rates of usage. The recommendation was to reduce this 
number to 617 district-level beds, simultaneously re-allocate 
the beds to correspond with geographical need, and increase 
Brits Hospital from a 66-bed facility to a 267-bed level 1 district 
hospital (unpublished data). Owing to the cost of renovating 
the old building, it was decided that a new hospital should 
be built. The nearest referral hospital is J S Tabane Hospital in 
Rustenburg, 72 km away. 
Sanitation, water, electricity, other economic development 
in the area, land ownership, current use and soil type were 
considered in evaluating various options regarding the location 
of a future new hospital. It was concluded that the site of the 
existing hospital was the best location.
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Background. In 2001, North West Province took the decision 
to increase bed capacity at Brits Hospital from 66 beds 
to 267 beds. After careful consideration of costs and an 
assessment of available land, it was decided to demolish the 
existing hospital and rebuild the new hospital on the same 
site. It was planned that during this time clinical services 
would be moved to a temporary makeshift hospital and 
to primary health care clinics. This case study documents 
the consequences of this decision to move services to the 
makeshift hospital and how these challenges were dealt with.
Methods. A cross-sectional descriptive study was undertaken. 
Ten key members of staff at management and service delivery 
level, in the hospital and the district, were interviewed. Key 
documents, reports, correspondence, hospital statistics and 
minutes of meetings related to the move were analysed.
Results. The plan had several unforeseen consequences 
with serious effects on patient care. Maternity services were 
particularly affected. Maternity beds decreased from 30 beds 
in the former hospital to 4 beds in the makeshift hospital. As 
numbers of deliveries did not greatly decrease, this resulted 
in severe overcrowding, making monitoring and care difficult. 
Perinatal mortality rates doubled after the move. An increase 
in maternal deaths was noted. The lack of inpatient ward 
space resulted in severe overcrowding in Casualty. The lack of 
X-ray facilities necessitated patients being referred to a facility 
72 km away, which often caused a delay of 3 days before 
management was completed. After-hours X-rays were done 
in a private facility, adding to unforeseen costs. Although the 
initial plan was for the makeshift hospital to stabilise and 
refer most patients, referral routes were not agreed upon or 
put in writing, and no extra transportation resources were 
allocated. The pharmacy had insufficient space for storage 
of medication. In spite of all these issues, relationships and 
capacity at clinics were strengthened, but not sufficiently to 
meet the need.
Discussion. Hospital revitalisation requires detailed planning 
so that services are not disrupted. Several case studies 
have highlighted the planning necessary when services are 
to be moved temporarily. Makeshift hospitals have been 
used when renovating or building hospitals. During war 
or disasters, plans have been made to decant patients from 
one facility to another. From the Brits case study, it would 
appear that not enough detailed planning for the move was 
done initially. This observation includes failure to appreciate 
the interrelatedness of systems and the practicality of the 
proposal, and to budget for the move and not just the new 
structure.
Conclusion. The current service offered at the makeshift 
hospital at Brits is not adequate and has resulted in poor 
patient care. It is the result of a planning process that did 
not examine the consequences of the move, both logistic and 
financial, in adequate detail. Committed hospital staff have 
tried their best to offer good care in difficult circumstances. 
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It was planned that, during construction of the hospital, 
clinical services would be moved to a makeshift hospital and to 
primary health care clinics. The makeshift hospital was to offer 
a very limited range of services; the casualty department was 
to stabilise critically ill patients before transferring them; the 
maternity department was to be for emergency deliveries only; 
and a short-stay ward was planned for overnight observation, 
with 15 beds. There were to be no X-ray or theatre facilities. 
Most outpatients were supposed to be seen in the clinics and 
not in the hospital. Similarly, most deliveries were to be done at 
the clinics and not at the hospital. 
A nearby building was converted into a makeshift hospital 
comprising converted rooms for casualty, a labour ward 
and a maternity ward, a board room, a pharmacy and some 
offices. Two park homes for use as a sleep-over ward and 
one for the antiretroviral (ARV) clinic were later added. The 
move to the makeshift hospital in February 2008 had many 
unforeseen consequences with regard to clinical care. These are 
documented so that future hospital revitalisation planning may 
take note of lessons learned from the Brits case study.
Methods
A report to document the challenges and successes of the move 
was requested by the North West Provincial Department of 
Health. A cross-sectional descriptive study was undertaken 
in July 2009. Ten key members of staff at management and 
service delivery level, in the hospital and the district, were 
interviewed. Key documents, reports, correspondence, hospital 
statistics and minutes of meetings related to the move were 
analysed. Data were checked with local staff members and the 
draft report was submitted for comment and correction.
Results
Maternity services
Maternity services were badly affected by the move to the 
makeshift hospital. The 30-bed maternity ward in the former 
hospital was reduced to a 4-bed unit in the makeshift hospital – 
a decrease in bed capacity of 85%. However, deliveries at 
the hospital only decreased by 30% in spite of deliveries at 
one clinic increasing from 4 to 84 per month (Fig. 1). As the 
makeshift hospital had no theatre, patients requiring caesarean 
section had to be transferred to a level 1 hospital in Gauteng 
Province (23 km away). Before the signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with Gauteng, these patients were 
transferred to a level 2 hospital in North West (72 km away).
The decrease in beds resulted in severe overcrowding in the 
hospital maternity ward, with a decreased capacity to care for 
women and newborns. The perinatal mortality rate doubled 
after the hospital moved (Fig. 2), intrapartum asphyxia and 
pre-term labour being significant causes. Care of premature 
babies was particularly problematic. Maternal deaths also 
increased after the hospital closure. 
Inpatient services
It was planned that the makeshift hospital would only stabilise 
and refer patients to other facilities and that few would be 
admitted as sleep-over patients for observation. For several 
reasons, this did not happen. Referral routes were not agreed 
upon before the move. The sleep-over beds were used as 
admission beds for female and paediatric patients. As only 
two park homes were provided for this service, male patients 
were supposed to be referred to facilities over 80 km away. 
Patients often refused to be transferred this distance and 
insisted on sleeping over in casualty instead, often resulting 
in severe overcrowding of casualty and patients being nursed 
on the floor. This problem was eventually resolved after the 
Department of Health supplied a third park home that was 
used as a male admission ward in December 2008.
It was planned that the majority of patients would be seen at 
clinics. Although numbers of patients seen at clinics increased, 
the numbers of patients seen in casualty did not decrease, 
further straining services (Table I).
Fig. 1. Changes in deliveries at Brits Hospital and clinics.
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Fig. 1. Changes in deliveries at Brits Hospital and clinics.
Fig. 2. Perinatal mortality rate at Brits Hospital.
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Fig. 2. Perinatal mor ality rate a  Brits Hospital.
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X-ray services
The initial business plan for the makeshift hospital did not 
provide for X-ray facilities. Instead, patients were to be sent by 
bus during working hours to a level 2 hospital 72 km away. As 
patients often had to wait a day for the provided transport and 
then a day to be seen after their return with a radiograph, their 
clinical management could take up to 3 days from the time of 
initial consultation. For emergency X-rays, an arrangement was 
made with a private health facility. This also caused several 
critical delays in the care of severely injured patients, who had 
to wait to be transferred to and from this private facility, often 
accompanied by a staff member from Brits Hospital, resulting 
in considerable expense that was not budgeted for. In the 
2008/9 financial year, 4 300 X-rays were taken at the level 2 
hospital, at a cost of R532 737, and 694 emergency X-rays were 
done at a cost of R520 072.
Referral pathways
In spite of the plan for the makeshift hospital to stabilise and 
refer most patients, there was uncertainty at the time of the 
move around referral routes, with no clear written policy. The 
initial plan to refer patients to a level 1 hospital 23 km away 
was complicated by the moving of a provincial boundary. Until 
an MOU was signed between the two provinces 18 months 
later, patients were instead transferred to a level 2 hospital in 
Rustenburg. 
Although it was planned that more patients would need 
transfer, capacity at emergency medical and rescue services 
(EMRS) was not increased and vehicle numbers remained the 
same as in 2006. In addition, no extra vehicle was supplied 
to EMRS for the purpose of transferring patients for X-rays. 
No addition of suitably trained EMRS staff was made, so that 
hospital staff were often used to escort patients in ambulances 
during transfer. Critically injured patients were brought to 
the hospital in spite of agreements that such patients should 
be transferred elsewhere, as emergency personnel felt that the 
distances to other facilities were too great and patients needed 
stabilisation first.
Pharmacy
The pharmacy in the makeshift hospital was about half the size 
of the pharmacy in the old hospital, resulting in severe space 
constraints for storage of medicines; one solution was to build 
shelves higher, raising concern over safety issues. Boxes were 
stored in passages, a basement store and a room containing 
a toilet cistern. Nevertheless, the pharmacy still handled pre-
packaging and supply to all 25 sub-district clinics, EMRS, 
old-age homes and the ARV clinic. The pharmacy failed an 
inspection by the South African Pharmacy Council in 2008. 
Staff response
There were many other disruptions to clinical and 
administrative services. Nevertheless, many staff tried hard 
to offer care in difficult circumstances. Managers expressed 
repeated concerns over the situation and tried in many ways to 
alleviate the pressure. One positive outcome was an improved 
relationship between the hospital and the clinics, with bi-
monthly joint management meetings and increased numbers of 
patients seen at clinic level.
Discussion
A limitation of this case study was incomplete access to all 
information: many hospital documents were difficult to access 
and documents could not be found; some hospital computers 
were faulty; and some maternity statistics were recorded in two 
places and showed different figures. Background information 
on decisions taken was not available as several key informants 
could not be interviewed owing to the high turnover of staff.
Hospital revitalisation requires detailed planning so that 
services are not disrupted. Moving of services during hospital 
renovation by making use of a temporary makeshift hospital, 
as was done at Brits, has been done successfully elsewhere. 
In 1998, one of the largest hospitals in Malaysia used a 
mobile surgical unit while its main operating theatres were 
renovated.3 Similarly, a Malaysian hospital in Kota Kinabalu 
used container-based operating theatres adjoining the existing 
theatres while renovating the old theatres and building a new 
theatre complex.3
However, such processes cannot be undertaken lightly. 
Case studies have highlighted the planning necessary when 
services are to be moved temporarily. In renovating the 
emergency department of the Hospital for Sick Children in 
Toronto, Canada,4 a dedicated team was formed, representing 
all departments. The importance of communication was 
emphasised. The team developed a plan whereby lower-acuity 
patients were decanted to clinics rather than admitted to the 
emergency department. Some patients were admitted directly 
to beds in the wards. The team emphasised the importance of 
starting to change these processes before the physical space 
was renovated, to start early and challenge all plans and 
design processes. Even with this planning, they noted the 
need to modify the physical design during construction as 
some impacts of operational changes were discovered during 
construction. They advised those undertaking similar projects 
to study the impact of the reconstruction and the resulting 
gaps more carefully. The timing of the process changes was 
important.
Table I. Numbers of patients seen at Brits Hospital
   July 2007  July 2008
Total admissions  514  495
Maternity admissions 372  298
Patients seen in casualty  647  1 013
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Similar experiences in Australia highlighted these 
complexities. At the Orange Base Hospital, during the planning 
of constructing a new hospital, the responsibilities of the 
Project Company regarding decanting of patients were clearly 
written from the start of the project.5 These included meeting 
with the relevant departments at least 12 months before the 
decant and ascertaining the specific requirements at all stages. 
A written decant plan for each department was to be provided 
to the hospital. The contract stated that it must be ensured that 
there was no interruption to services at theatres, sterilising, 
emergency, imaging and intensive care.
In Bathurst, Australia, a new hospital was built and services 
were to be decanted from the old heritage building to the new 
hospital, in stages. In this process, a detailed decanting pack 
was made available to all staff to inform them of the planned 
changes.6 Recognising their critical role, emergency services 
and maternity services were the last to be moved, and most 
other services were to be in place at the time those services 
were moved. It was made clear that the old building was to 
be demolished only once all staff had moved into the new 
hospital. Despite such planning, the transfer of services did not 
proceed smoothly. At the time of moving, the new hospital was 
deemed to have serious safety and design flaws. All elective 
surgery was therefore cancelled and the planned demolition of 
the old hospital was postponed.7
Hospital reconstruction is not the only scenario where 
planning for the decanting of patients and moving of services 
are necessary. In planning for disasters in the UK’s West 
Gloucester region, provisions were made for patients to be 
decanted to smaller hospitals so as to free beds in the larger 
hospitals.8 This was to be done by agreed-upon procedures 
outlined in the major incident plan and included additional 
resources for transport and management. Decanting was only 
done in line with the capacity of the smaller hospital to care for 
such patients.
In other situations, such as epidemics, war or disasters, 
plans have been made for patients to be decanted and services 
moved from one facility to another. The BMJ of October 1938 
records a plan of being able to clear between 30% and 50% 
of beds in most hospitals by sending patients home should 
a disaster occur during a major war.9 The remaining patients 
were to be decanted to hospitals that were less suitable for 
receiving air raid victims. Thirty-four hospitals in London were 
identified for such decanting, and plans were made to move 
between 3 000 and 4 000 patients by ambulance trains to towns 
50 miles or more from London. Transportation arrangements 
were clear, with exact directions on which trains would be 
converted and where they would run.  There was to be good 
communication in the referral system, with conferences held 
with the hospitals to receive patients and decanting proposals 
explained in detail. Provision was also made to supply these 
centres with additional equipment and linen.
These cases illustrate the detailed planning required to 
ensure that services are not interrupted. They emphasise 
the importance of allocating additional resources during the 
decanting process. Even where this has taken place certain 
issues are often not considered and lessons are learnt in 
retrospect. 
From the Brits case study, it appears that there was 
insufficient initial detailed planning for the move. This 
included failure to appreciate the inter-relatedness of systems, 
the impracticality of the proposal and failure to budget for 
the move to, and not just the additional running costs of, 
the new structure. It is critical that clinicians are involved 
in the planning and decision making because of the major 
consequences of such processes for clinical care.
Conclusion
The current service offered at the makeshift hospital at Brits is 
inadequate and has resulted in poor patient care. It is the result 
of a planning process that did not examine the consequences of 
the move, both logistic and financial, in adequate detail. While 
the adequacy of care provided by clinical and support staff was 
not assessed, it would be unfair to hold them solely responsible 
for the poor outcomes, which might have been worse without 
the dedication of many of them.
Sincere thanks to staff and management at Brits Hospital and 
Madibeng sub-district office for their assistance and perseverance 
in difficult circumstances.
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